Societies are made of more than one individual. If a ruler governed only one individual, it would be easy to find whether or not he is a tyrant: just ask his single subject. Does “society” love its ruler? But in any actual country, the fact that a minority or even a majority of the ruled supports a ruler does not mean that he is not a tyrant. That a society must not be conceived as a single individual is a central feature of the methodological individualism used by economics to analyze society.
These considerations were illustrated by a response to a tweet where I had called Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán a tyrant. Somebody replied:
Have you ever asked some hungarians [sic] what they think of him? They adore him. He’s no tyrant. Angela Merkel is one.
The understanding missing here is that society is composed of individuals who are not necessarily unanimous and that a tyrant can be supported by a large part of the population. My correspondent also does not appear consistent when he adds that Angela Merkel is a tyrant, for surely some Germans adore her.
That a tyrant can be adored by some part of the population and even a large part is illustrated by tyrants of ancient Greece. In her instructive book Greek Tyranny (Bristol Phoenix Press, 2009), Sian Lewis writes:
That the demos [the “people,” especially little people] played an essential part in the creation of a tyrant is very clear in our sources: Sicilian tyrants are elected strategos autocrator, or later, hailed as kings … The consent of the demos was necessary for a tyrant to take power.
Agathocles was the tyrant of Syracuse during a quarter of a century before his death in 289 B.C. He was so popular, Lewis tells us, “that he needed no bodyguard.” Among his gifts to the demos were a cancellation of debts and a redistribution of land. Another example was Gelon I, again in Syracuse, who was acclaimed tyrant by the demos in 479 B.C. He had “summoned the people to an assembly fully armed” (the people could come fully armed) but, as later reported by Greek historian Diodorus, he himself
appeared before them not only unarmed, but without a tunic, wearing only a cloak, and stepping forward he gave an account of his life and deeds on behalf of the Syracusans. The crowd shouted their approval at each deed that he mentioned and were amazed that he had entrusted himself unarmed to anyone who might wish to kill him, so much so that they not only did not punish him for having taken the tyranny, but with one voice hailed him as their benefactor, savior, and king.
On this criterion, today’s rulers must not be very popular. However, as I explained in a previous Econlog post, many factors have changed, including the technology of tyrannicide.
If you define a tyrant as a person who oppresses part of the population, the oppressed part can be a minority or a majority. Of course, it can’t be 100% because the tyrant needs supporters and helpers, which generally include a praetorian guard. Not every tyrant is an Agathocles or a Gelon. A tyrant is a tyrant because he uses political power to favor his supporters to the detriment of the oppressed. Such is the implicit bargain between the tyrant and his supporter. That the tyrant is adored by his supporters is not surprising. The others are more likely to hate him, except if propaganda has made them feel like “patriots” sacrificing for the good of the greater whole.
Defining instead a tyrant as a person who governs arbitrarily and brutally brings us back to the first definition, because the smaller his supporting majority or minority, the more he will have to rely on lawlessness and violence to impose and maintain his rule.
It seems to be a matter of definition and analytical convenience whether or not, or to which extent, the supporters of the tyrant are considered members of a collective tyrant—as in a tyranny of the majority or of a minority—or just supporters.
A tyrant brings some social benefits—such as order, external protection, public monuments, and infrastructure—that, although serving his own selfish goals, do trickle down to those he oppresses. Mussolini made the trains run on time and, others would add, Hitler fought tobacco. In his book On Power, Bertrand de Jouvenel made that argument, as later did economist Mancur Olson in explaining the advantage of “stationary bandits” (like tyrants) as opposed to “roving bandits.” Whether the benefits of tyranny exceed its costs for the exploited minority (or majority) is not for them to say.
Can a ruler be called a tyrant if he abides by a law (“the law”) that allows him to discriminate against a portion of his subjects? In ancient Greece, the difference between a king and a tyrant was that the former was constrained by laws. But certainly, laws can be tyrannical: just think of American slavery, which was protected by the Constitution. Everything is a matter of degree, and we should say that a ruler is a tyrant to the extent that he consistently favors a given part of the population against another, even if the law allows it.
Thus, recognizing a tyrant is not easy, especially before he has assumed full power. The process can be so gradual that most people may not see tyranny coming; only the last step may be obvious. (See my Regulation review of the recent book edited by Cass Sunstein, Can It Happen Here?) But it is certainly not necessary that the tyrant be adored by no one.
READER COMMENTS
Benjamin Cole
May 18 2019 at 8:20pm
Tyrants and infrastructure: Pierre L. raises a fascinating point.
Let us posit that modern economies need good working infrastructure.
I am not sure what is the libertarian solution to the need for first-rate infrastructure. I rather suspect that libertarianism and the building of infrastructure is a null set.
From what I read, the Communist Party of China does a good job in providing first right infrastructure. From what I see, the infrastructure in many parts of the United States is falling apart ( I take it that the US military is regarded as first rate, if fantastically expensive).
This advantage in building infrastructure alone may not be enough to assure Sino supremacy or higher living standards (in relation the US) in the years ahead.
But if higher living standards are desired, then how to build infrastructure? Is there a role for tyrants in economic-development?
Pierre Lemieux
May 19 2019 at 4:19pm
Good questions, but don’t forget one thing. “Infrastructure” has to be defined. There is infrastructure and infrastructure. For example, the “food infrastructure” or the “housing infrastructure” is much better produced by the market than by government planning—at east if “best” or efficiency is defined in terms of the satisfaction of individual preferences.
The economic way of looking at infrastructure would be to limit it to public goods. Your question of how to produce public goods is closely related to the justification or non-justification of the state–a crucial and vast topic. Anthony de Jasay’s latest book help pursue it; I have reviewed in Regulation.
On the question raised by your last paragraph, assuming that infrastructure has been defined in a useful way, you might want to refer to my answer to Phil H below.
Phil H
May 19 2019 at 5:43am
“A tyrant brings some socal benefits—such as order, external protection, public monuments, and infrastructure”
I have a real problem with statements like this. How true are they? Do tyrants bring external protection? In general, democracies don’t go to war with each other, so clearly democracy brings a measure of external protection that tyrants don’t. Some tyrants do keep their countries safe, but is their hit-rate any better than chance?
Public monuments… Again, there are some, but I can’t see any particular reason to see them as being more frequent than the public works of non-tyrants. Mt Rushmore, Britain’s Angel of the North, any of the various war memorials… Less bombastic than tyrant monuments, but I’m not convinced they are less important or fewer in number.
Infrastructure – just no. All the most developed countries are democracies. They have the best infrastructure.
Which leaves public order. And here I think the problem is a chicken/egg thing. A tyrant whose state is not orderly soon falls. If a strongman’s state is orderly, the strongman’s state survives long enough to be called a tyrant. But it seems entirely possible that the order causes the tyrant, rather than the other way round.
Mark Z
May 19 2019 at 7:34am
Your ‘chicken vs. egg’ point applies to the other ones as well though. Countries that feel less threatened by foreign nations may just be more disposed to democracy rather than (or in addition to) democracy making them peaceful. Countries with good infrastructure may feel less of a ‘need’ for a strongman.
Certainly if many people believe dictatorship is conducive to better infrastructure or protection, then one would likely expect the most threatened, undeveloped countries to tend toward dictatorship.
Phil H
May 19 2019 at 8:42am
Nice! That’s clearly right, but I think there are some clear reasons to reject the peace-causes-democracy direction of causation. Democracy as it stands today remains largely a project of Europe and places directly affected by Europe; and Europe is a famously war-torn continent, surely as much so as any other. Plus, there are plenty of intuitive reasons to think that democracy might reduce warmongering, i.e. voting out people who get soldiers killed. Not airtight reasoning, but not inconsiderable.
The point about belief is a good one. I think you’re right that many people seem to believe that a strongman will protect them. Which is why it’s important for the reality-based community not to let this particular error (I think it’s an error!) go unchallenged.
Pierre Lemieux
May 19 2019 at 4:42pm
Whether democracies engage more or less in war may depend on whether they are limited democracies or “totalitarian democracies” (to use an expression emphasized by Jouvenel). In On Power, Jouvenel argues that, after the 17th century, democratic governments have much increased the extent and devastations of wars because such governments can claim all “national resources” and consider individuals as mere “human potential” as Roosevelt said. Universal conscription was impossible for even Louis XIV; only democracy made it possible.
Pierre Lemieux
May 19 2019 at 4:34pm
One important clarification: I did not say, nor did Jouvenel or Olson say, that a tyrant is better at producing public goods (including “infrastructure” that is actually demanded by consumers) than a democratic government is. The argument is that tyranny is better than a situation of war of all against all where the first roving bandit steals all the crop and rides over the farmer’s implements because, anyway, the next roving bandit would do it anyway. A democratic government, Olson showed, is better than tyranny, because it steals less and promotes more prosperity and economic growth (on this see on this the Olson link I gave). Jouvenel would have agreed, but perhaps by insisting more on the necessity to constrain the democratic state.
Boot
May 19 2019 at 9:13pm
What exactly makes Orbán a tyrant or a tyrant-to-be? I thought this post would address that issue – or at least fulfill the promise of its ambitious title with some sort of analytical grid that would help one to recognize a tyrant(-to-be).
Obviously (perhaps not to the tweeter correspondent but surely to most), the democratic sanction of the majority doesn’t make a tyrant a non-tyrant. The corollary of this is that the hatred of a minority, of a majority of external observers, of any number of people, or any combination of those, a tyrant doesn’t make. Same for edicts from self-anointed ivory towers.
I have yet to see an argument for “Orbán-as-a-tyrant(-to-be)” that isn’t based on pure partisan/public policy preference tribalism – like the law that originated the CEU affair or his skepticism on European political union. However, if that’s the threshold, I’d propose almost all leaders in modern liberal democracies are tyrants.
Phil H
May 20 2019 at 10:40pm
The answer to this is straightforward: Orban appears to be engaged in destroying the mechanisms of political checks and balances, which implies tyrannical intent. Two of the ways he is doing this: removing power from the judiciary (and stacking the judiciary with sympathetic judges); removing the power of the press by ending free speech. There are also other smaller actions, e.g. attacks on academics.
He also engages in a bunch of prejudiced rhetoric about Muslims and Jews, which is pretty typical of European dictators.
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