Novelists are from time to time capable of rousing expectations for their upcoming works. That’s far more difficult for authors of non fiction. For this reason, I do much admire Yoram Hazony, who has been able to advertise his upcoming book for a full year, which is finally due this week, with a series of op-eds in The Wall Street Journal. They were all truly thought-provoking and those who strongly disagree with Hazony’s argument should be grateful for him making it, in a clear and interesting way.
The latest piece was published on August 25. In that article, Hazony sees the current populist upheaval as “resistance to the European Union and its policies in Britain, Italy, Austria, Poland and Hungary”. Certainly Hazony’s book would be welcomed (were they ever to show a greater interest in books) by movements like the Northern League, the FPO, PIS and Fidesz. I wish him not to regret, in the future, these bedfellows.
The book is indeed rooted in his sense of allegiance to Israel and his profound disregard for international bodies such as the UN and the EU.
In the article, Hazony summarises a few of key points of his book:
1. Nationalism is unjustly blamed for the two world wars. The first was the result of imperial plots, the second was prompted by Hitler, who was (mostly) an imperialist and not (that much of) a nationalist;
2. Nationalism is related with the emergence of religious tolerance, as the treaty of Westphalia of 1648 “marked Europe’s turn away from the ideal of a universal monarchy—a Christian aspiration since Roman times—in favor of a diversity of constitutional and religious arrangements in different states”;
3. The nation state is the fertile ground upon which constitutionalism and relatively limited government blossomed.
In the article, as opposed to the disregard he shows in his book, Hazony engages with Elie Kedourie, the author of a splendid book, Nationalism (1960), which I see as building upon the great 1862 article by Lord Acton on “Nationality”.
I find Hazony’s view of European history troublesome. For one thing, saying that Hitler wasn’t a “nationalist” is, to use a euphemism, a far more controversial claim than he acknowledges. Let’s put it in this way: can you picture national socialism raising to power without Herder, Fichte, and all the other prophets of nationalism? I doubt it.
Second, the treaty of Augsburg (1555) and then Wesphalia indeed established the principle “cuius regio, eius religio” (whose place whose religion). This was a reaction to an event that destroyed the unity of Christianity, namely the Reformation. Whatever your sentiments and views on the matter, the Reformation grew the potential for belligerency and aggression in Europe, providing princes with a powerful justification: religion, indeed, that led to religious wars. Blaming them on the Catholic Church’s pretence of universality seems to me an exercise in putting cause and effect upside down. To be sure, sovereigns of all kind always had a tendency to wage wars one against the other. But the difference, in this regard, is the legitimization they can claim.
In a sense, this is THE problem with nationalism. Before it, wars aimed at changing borders were due to limited confrontations, they were often solved with marriage diplomacy, always ended up in some sort of treaty regulating the matter. After the rise of nationalism, changing borders became a matter concerned with the sanctity of the nation. Nationalism is, together with technology, the essential ingredient for modern war, which is mass war both because of the weapons government can employ up to annihilation of million _and_ because of its ability to mobilise millions to fight one against the other.
In actual fact, national identities are often very recent things (think about Italy, or Germany indeed) which were clearly instrumental to the democratisation and mobilisation of the masses for some political goal.
In this sense, it doesn’t come as a surprise that Hazony’s criticism of Kedourie do not get to the core of Kedourie’s book and its thesis. Kedourie saw in nationalism the offspring of romanticism, a theory which claimed sovereignty for manufactured identities: nations that were to be defined by the distinctness of its culture (typically identified with the possession of a distinct language).
This was a revolutionary doctrine, that claimed that the legitimacy of power rested in something else than what had prevailed for most of the history of humankind. It was instrumental in transforming politics from a “limited” enterprise to an ideological quest where masses were promised salvation from all the hardships they suffered, by the means of national emancipation. I’m not doing justice to the book, which is incredibly rich, and profound, and ought to be considered a true classic in 20th century political thought. But you get the gist of it, I hope.
Claiming that we owe constitutionalism to the nation state doesn’t mean much. The nation state has been a tremendously successful institution: it claimed the world for itself, it destroyed alternatives to it (even international bodies like the EU are basically cartels of nation states, no more no less), it became the arena for political confrontations. Limited government and economic planning, as we conceive them now, are limited government and economic planning within its boundaries. The welfare state is, in some way, another project that aimed to sustain its own legitimacy (basically, today a nation is that political unity within which redistribution can take place). But are we sure we cannot conceived liberty in other institutional setting?
Arnold Kling righty points out “this is an issue that is particularly challenging for libertarians. that We believe that national borders restrict freedom, including the freedom to live where you want. But what if every project to get rid of national borders is one in which power is concentrated in a central authority?”
This is a old debate, and it won’t end any soon. I’d like only to point out that it is not that the only alternative to the nation state is “larger scale” government. It can also be a mix of larger scale government and much “smaller scale” government. One thing the nation state typically despises is localism: which competes for people’s allegiance and their understanding of their own identity, but typically doesn’t have that monopolistic ambition over it which made nationalism so bloody and dreaded.
READER COMMENTS
Salem
Sep 6 2018 at 8:42am
I assume that when you write the Treaty of Augusta (?) you mean Augsburg.
Alberto Mingardi
Sep 7 2018 at 12:04pm
Thank you, @Salem.
P Burgos
Sep 6 2018 at 10:43am
I feel like any discussion of nationalism that doesn’t deal with changes in war making due to small firearms and other small, mobile, explosive devices is missing a big part of the picture. Before nationalism, war was rather limited in part because it was more expensive, and also because it was more or less the aristocracy fighting over who they were able to tax and extort. However, if everyone has access to small firearms and can easily improvise explosives and fight a guerilla war, suddenly states need to be stronger (and need a stronger identity) just to keep from breaking apart. So if a democracy is going to sustain itself in the face of say, a hostile, autocratic empire, it will need to have a strong state (and military) and likely strong nationalism. So far as I can tell, some form of nationalism is the only viable alternative to empire, which is the form of government and social organization that nationalism replaced. Sure, there are some small places that fall between the cracks and can survive for long periods of time, but mostly it is empires of one form or another fighting each other and dominating most of the world. We still have the Chinese and Russian empires with us to this day, and if we did away with nationalism I don’t see what would prevent Iran and Saudi Arabia to actually try to expand their boundaries, or for other (authoritarian) states to return to the practice of fighting wars to gain territory.
JK Brown
Sep 7 2018 at 3:03am
“It can also be a mix of larger scale government and much “smaller scale” government.”
That hasn’t really worked out in the US, especially over the last century. The larger scale government has increasingly co-opted the small scale government through control of tax dollars. There is a continuous trend toward national legislation or judicial rulings that lead to national conformity. We are at the point today that the national government provides/controls direct services that used to be the bailiwick of municipal governments. The trend is for the President, which I believe became more refined under the Obama administration, to speak and try to act like a kind of super-mayor. Many in Congress act more like aldermen in their desire to be the one who seen as responsible for some service to voters.
I see little reason to think some world government wouldn’t have the same creep into direct control. The EU has certainly been usurping member national and even local governments with direct EU bureaucratic dictates in minute detail.
Chris
Sep 7 2018 at 9:46am
“For one thing, saying that Hitler wasn’t a ‘nationalist’ is, to use a euphemism, a far more controversial claim than he acknowledges.”
“Claiming that we owe constitutionalism to the nation state doesn’t mean much.”
I don’t mean to be overly critical of the author. Anybody’s usage of broad terms like nationalism and constitutionalism in cause-and-effect relationships is open to much mischief. It’s hard to wrangle history, especially if you’re looking to make strong explanatory arguments (see also the material above on the Reformation).
All the same, unless history’s just one damned thing after another, some explanation is needed. For my money, Ernest Gellner offered a much more robust and resilient account than Kedourie (while acknowledging much that Kedourie was right about).
Sadly, a quick glance at the index of Hazony’s book suggests he doesn’t engage either thinker (or Benedict Anderson’s seminal account)…
Mark
Sep 7 2018 at 10:38am
What is the distinction the author is trying to draw between nationalism and imperialism? I would define nationalism as putting the interests of one’s own nation first. In that sense, the European empires were arguably non-nationalist as many of them believed their empires to be delivering benefits of Christianity and civilization to the conquered peoples. However, Hitler’s wars of aggression were indisputably nationalist—the goal was to improve the German people’s living standards by taking the resources of inferior peoples, who were to be annihilated.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 9 2018 at 12:39am
Very interesting post, Alberto. I don’t think it contradicts what I was trying to get at in my post on “The Tyranny of the National Interest,” although it would have helped me refine my on-going reflection on that topic. It would also have improved my review of Hazony’s book, to appear in the forthcoming (Fall) issue of Regulation.
Harvey Cody
Sep 12 2018 at 11:23am
While Mingardi’s critique presents excellent counterarguments to Hazony’s observations and claims, it does not address some of Hazony’s most compelling challenges to globalism (which are worthy of consideration regardless of who is getting causes and effects upside down).
Hazony acknowledges that nationalism if fraught with problems. (But, what form of human assemblage isn’t?) He claims, however, that globalists are overlooking or erroneously dismissing some positive aspects of nationalism and some negative aspects of globalization (similar to what protectionists do concerning free trade). In particular:
“National cohesion is the secret ingredient that allows free institutions to exist, the bedrock on which a functioning democracy is built.” All but the most radical libertarians acknowledge that free institutions (e.g., rule of law, protected property rights) are essential to liberty. Mingardi does not refute the claim that national cohesion are essential to free institutions (see my last comment below).
“Diversity and originality are a consequence of competition among independent nations, each developing its own unique constitutional and religious traditions.” Libertarians also accurately claim that competition spurs improvements, e.g., in standards of living. Critiques of Hazony’s work should either refute his claim that nationalism induces more competition than would otherwise be the case or acknowledge this benefit of nationalism over globalization is true, i.e., they should emulate Hazony in this regard, “Kedourie is right that national independence is often marred by disputes over where to draw the borders between states.”
“…by the 20th century, the ideal of the independent nation had become the central factor in dismantling European colonial rule around the world, often with the support of American statesmen.” Shouldn’t he get at least a half cheer for nationalism?
“This formal recognition that diversity among nations is legitimate shattered the old assumption that only one way of life could be correct.” Toleration is a necessary precondition for liberty. To have diversity among nations, there must be nations. If Hanzony’s claim that nations are essential to toleration is true, Mingardi’s critique is for naught. Consequently, this is a point Mingardi should have addressed.
“But nationalism’s vices are outweighed by its considerable virtues.” Quibbling about facts without addressing this ultimate claim is the greatest shortcoming of Mingardi’s critique.
Oddly, in the WSJ articles I read, Hazony did not advance what I believe to be his most compelling claim (which he made in a recent EconTalk podcast). With a one-world government, there is no check or balance on powerful humans gaining ever more power, which inevitably leads to tyranny. While Mingardi’s critique was fairly limited to what Hazony said in the WSJ articles, Mingardi’s critique should have been more tempered in its attack on the work of a comrade fighting tyranny.
Comments are closed.