George Selgin is the most frequent guest on David Beckworth’s Macro Musings podcast, and listening to the recent interview it’s easy to see why. I would have trouble finding a single point on which I disagree. I see Selgin as a more eloquent and better-informed version of myself.
While much of the podcast discusses issues such as Bitcoin and debanking, I’ll provide a few comments on the final portion, which covers the Fed’s upcoming monetary policy review. Here’s Selgin:
[A]ll this stuff, from just having a plain old 2% inflation target, to having a flexible average inflation target, to having God knows what they’re going to come up with next, some acronym with inflation in it— All of this is just a way of getting to what really works, which would be targeting nominal GDP.
But they can’t say that. They don’t even want to talk about it because it doesn’t sound like the dual mandate. And this is really unfortunate, because NGDP targeting is a good way to come up with good behavior of both the inflation rate and employment. It’s a way to avoid severe unemployment. It’s a way to avoid overheating the labor market. It’s a way to gain a long run inflation rate of around 2%, but while also allowing prices to behave differently during supply shocks in a way that, again, best preserves stability in the labor market, which is the other thing you want.
It accomplishes all of those things. The one thing NGDP has going against it is it is not obviously the same thing as stable prices or high employment. It doesn’t sound like the dual mandate. So, we have to figure out, I think, what the Fed has been doing has been stumbling its way towards strategy language that sounds like the dual mandate but is actually stable NGDP. They would save a lot of time doing this, and, maybe, who knows how many more strategic reviews if they would just acknowledge what they’ve been up to and at least, secretly, talk about stabilizing spending.
Unfortunately, David Beckworth indicates that the Fed is not likely to move in the direction of NGDP level targeting.
This is a good illustration of what concerns me about where I think the framework review is going, and that is, Jay Powell sat down with Catherine Rampell from The Washington Post. They did a little interview. She asked him about the framework review, and he said, “I see as a base case,” these are his words, “A reaction function where you don’t overcompensate or you don’t overshoot for past misses.” So, effectively, he’s saying, “I see as a base case, we don’t have makeup policy.”
After 2008, the Fed screwed up by not trying to do any make-up policy. In 2021 they screwed up in exactly the opposite direction, by doing far too much make-up, overshooting the previous NGDP trend line by 11%.
So when you’ve made one serious error going too much in one direction, and another serious error going too much in the opposite direction, isn’t the conclusion that you should aim for somewhere in the middle—do just the right amount of make-up? Instead, it seems as though the Fed is planning to return to the policy regime that led to the Great Recession. How can we explain that?
The following is just speculation on my part, but it’s the only explanation that I can think of. The Fed may be assuming that the zero rate problem is gone, and that for various reasons the (nominal) natural rate of interest will remain above zero. Why might that be? Perhaps some combination of slightly higher trend inflation than during the 2010s, slightly stronger real growth due to AI, and much bigger budget deficits for as far as the eye can see. The bond market is certainly not forecasting a return to the zero lower bound.
The second calculation may be that level targeting isn’t really necessary when you are not at the zero lower bound. They may be thinking that Alan Greenspan’s policy approach worked pretty well when rates were positive, and they can safety return to inflation targeting in a positive interest rate environment.
I don’t view that sort of reasoning as crazy, but in the end I do not agree. First of all, NGDP targeting works better than inflation targeting even during “normal times”. More importantly, macro history is full of unforeseen developments and thus you need a policy for all seasons. I have no doubt that during the 1990s my students were bored when I taught them about what happened in the 1930s when there was a severe banking crisis and interest rates fell to zero. That had never happened during their lives, or even in my (much longer) life. “Why do we need to learn this old stuff?” I hope that they saw the value of my teaching when they were working on Wall Street in 2008.
You never know what sort of changes will occur in the macroeconomy. Rather that take policy shortcuts, adopting a policy regime that might work in “fair weather”, isn’t the more responsible course of action to adopt a regime that works under almost all conditions? Indeed, isn’t that approach more responsible even if it is slightly harder to explain NGDP level targeting to Congress than it is to explain inflation targeting?
READER COMMENTS
Roger McKinney
Dec 29 2024 at 2:41pm
The Fed doesn’t fail because it has the wrong target. It can no more control nominal GDP than it could hit the moon. The problem is the long and variable lags from policy change to effect on inflation, a major factor in NGDP. Lags can be 2 to 5 years for max effect. Plus, the Fed doesn’t control federal spending, which forces the Fed to buy the added debt to keep rates low.
Ahmed Fares
Dec 29 2024 at 5:26pm
Scott says that monetary policy operates with leads, not lags.
Long and Variable LEADS
Ahmed Fares
Dec 29 2024 at 5:48pm
Nick Rowe comments on a different site on Scott’s article to explain the leads:
Market monetarists and the ‘myth’ of long and variable lags
Thomas L Hutcheson
Dec 30 2024 at 6:23pm
No the Fed does not _have to_ buy federal debt to keep interest rates low. It may _decide_ to abandon FAIT to do so, but can also let fiscal policy affect interest rates.
bill
Dec 29 2024 at 5:26pm
I listened to that episode. Excellent. That section made me think “why not NGDPLT, but the Fed could add some caveats”. The caveats could be like if inflation exceeded 4% for 2 years then….
Or if unemployment exceeded 7% then….
I worry that the caveats may weaken the commitment to NGDPLT that is some of its power. So maybe it’s not a good idea to get NGDPLT with caveats. I don’t know.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Dec 30 2024 at 6:27pm
Flexible Nominal GDP Level targeting looks like it woud be about the same in practice as FAIT assuming the flexibility was being exercised to maximally facilitate adjustment to shocks = maximize real income.
bill
Dec 29 2024 at 5:30pm
One other thought. Constrain the return to the LT. So if the target is 4% NGDPLT, and we go over, the Fed would temper the return by shooting for 3% per year until it was back on trend.
Scott Sumner
Dec 30 2024 at 12:49am
That sort of return path seems reasonable.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Dec 30 2024 at 6:31pm
If 4% was chosen to facilitate adjustment of relative prices to the normal level of shocks, why would 3% ever be an optimal intermediate target.
steve
Dec 30 2024 at 10:33am
Query- Has anyone tried NGDP targeting?
Steve
Scott Sumner
Dec 30 2024 at 4:57pm
No.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Dec 30 2024 at 6:19pm
I really wish Beckworth had asked him just what he thinks is wrong with FAIT. NGDP targeting does call for over-target inflation in in a negative demand shock as FAIT does, but not necessarily the real income maximizing amount. And it’s not clear what it does in a positive supply shock, or a positive or negative demand shock.
And Power was being quite forthright that the average that FAIT aims for is a forward looking average. Why would Selgin _want_ the Fed to make inflation (or NGDP, for that matter) over some arbitrary past and future time to average out to some fixed number? Of course, the inflation that the Fed wishes to engineer going forward has something to do with the size of past shocks, but how does that translate into targeting future inflation even partially to past inflation.
And oh if Rampell had only asked Powell to do a post mortem on 2020-2024! [If only the Joint Economic Committee would ask!] How much of the over- target inflation did the Fed then think and now think was necessary to restore micro-economic equilibrium? Did it make any errors? If so what did it learn from them?
Rajat
Dec 30 2024 at 9:30pm
I think you’re right that the Fed doesn’t think it will face the ZLB ‘problem’ for the foreseeable future and therefore this is about working within political constraints. The Fed faced a lot of heat from both sides of politics for its attempts to bring inflation down and the prospect of causing a recession in 2024/25 while pushing inflation below 2% for a sustained period to help make up for past upside misses is clearly untenable. Even if the adoption of level targeting is strictly forward-looking, no politician wants to risk having to deal with deliberate below-2% inflation in the future. Perhaps the timing of the review is unfortunate, because both sides have seen themselves as not benefitting from the Fed’s post-Covid raising of rates. The Dems’ economic cheerleaders (eg Krugman, Furman) didn’t like it when it commenced and are on the record for criticising it. Meanwhile Trump threatened to sack Powell for not being dovish enough. Who in hindsight thinks that stronger make-up tightening in 2024 – with more to come over 2025 – would have made their (re-)election easier? The time to introduce level-targeting was, unfortunately, 2012-2016. For that, Janet Yellen should wear the blame.
Dale Doback
Dec 31 2024 at 12:09pm
They don’t have to make up for past misses though. They need to (credibly) set expectations that they will make up for future misses. They can do this now without any labor market pain. Just set price level targets for the next 10 years and make it crystal clear that any bumps along the way will be smoothed to stay on that 10 year target.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Jan 1 2025 at 10:23pm
But smoothing can still imply below-target inflation. And it the target is already the minimum rate that allow relative prices to adjust to Brownian movement of supplies and demands, then below-target inflation implies incomplete adjustment = less than maximum real income.
Scott Sumner
Jan 2 2025 at 1:51am
What many people fail to appreciate is that the overshoot was primarily caused by a lack of level targeting. Yes, it would make no sense to do a make-up policy ex post if the level targeting regime was not in place ex ante, but if the regime had been in place in 2021, then a make-up policy would not have been particularly painful. That’s because the financial markets would have prevented a major overshoot of NGDP.
Thomas L Hutcheson
Dec 30 2024 at 10:50pm
“You never know what sort of changes will occur in the macroeconomy. Rather that take policy shortcuts, adopting a policy regime that might work in “fair weather”, isn’t the more responsible course of action to adopt a regime that works under almost all conditions? Indeed, isn’t that approach more responsible even if it is slightly harder to explain NGDP level targeting to Congress than it is to explain inflation targeting?”
There is an assertion that NGDPLT would “work” better in a r* = 0 world but why is that? What trajectory of policy instrument settings could achieve NGDPLT that could not achiever over-target inflation when that is needed to maximize real income?
Scott Sumner
Jan 2 2025 at 1:53am
Instrument settings are not a useful way to think about monetary policy.
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