The problem of the relations between the state and the individual was illustrated by a short Twitter exchange with a frequent contradictor of mine. He tweeted:
One of those general moral/political rules is the social contract, that Libertarians routinely deny … Or if there is such a contract, it is with the globe, thus justifying sacrificing the interests of the country of your birth that raised you.
I responded:
Oh your country raised you? Is ze/hir your father or your mother?
There was a mistake in my reply: I should have simply written “ze” instead of “ze/hir.” I admit I am not very much on top of that. Of course, anybody might use any noun or pronoun while referring to zirself, although I would deny that ze has the right to impose hir preference on others, especially with the armed help of the state. At any rate, my correspondent had a more scholarly response:
I was thinking of Socrates when he said the Laws of Athens were what made him into the man he turned out to be, for better or worse…
I replied:
I suspected that. That’s the ancient concept of liberty, which cost Socrates his life. See https://econlib.org/governing-ourselves/, and especially the classic and short text by Benjamin Constant linked there.
The exchange suggested that, as much as he defines himself as a conservative, my correspondent is an unconscious Rousseauist. It is surprising how many people are intellectual slaves to old Jean-Jacques Rousseau (to paraphrase a famous formulation by Keynes in the last paragraph of his General Theory), even if they don’t know it. In Of the Social Contract(1762), Rousseau wrote:
Furthermore, the citizen is no longer the judge of the dangers to which the law desires him to expose himself; and when the prince says to him: “It is expedient for the State that you should die,” he ought to die, because it is only on that condition that he has been living in security up to the present, and because his life is no longer a mere bounty of nature, but a gift made conditionally by the State.
Opposed to this approach stands not only the whole classical-liberal tradition but also Antigone, the eponymous heroine of Sophocles’s play. Antigone was written around 442 B.C., that is, before the death of Socrates was told in a Plato dialogue. In the Western tradition, the relations between the state and the individual are an old issue. King Creon said:
Whomsoever the city may appoint, that man must be obeyed, in little things and great, in just things and unjust … But anarchy is the worst of evils.
The MIT translation linked to above uses “disobedience” instead of “anarchy.” But Creon probably meant something closer to the latter, as Sophocles wrote “ἀναρχία” (anarchia). The French translation on my bookshelf, by Robert Pignarre, renders the term by its French equivalent, “anarchie.”
The important point is that Antigone did not agree with Creon. She disobeyed an edict of his and did not try to evade her responsibility. She believed there were laws above the state.
READER COMMENTS
Thaomas
Sep 7 2019 at 8:15am
Granted the State is neither mother nor father, but I do not think it is wrong (because it is too “natural to try to overcome) to place sympathy for fellow residents above that for people living farther away.
Jon Murphy
Sep 7 2019 at 8:24am
Absolutely! But note that is not what Pierre’s correspondent is doing. He (or she) is implying we should have no sympathy whatsoever with the foreigner, not even with regards to the laws of justice (if this correspondent is who I think it is, they have made this precise argument in the past).
We obviously care for our family more than our friends, our friends more than our neighborhood, our neighborhood more than our town, our town more than our county (etc etc spiraling outward). But being able to sympathize more with those closest to us does not imply we should sacrifice others for their gain. My brother is a pilot and I want to see him succeed, but it would be a vicious act for me to sabotage anyone competing with him for a promotion.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 7 2019 at 12:22pm
Jon: Very perceptive–on both counts!
Thaomas
Sep 7 2019 at 2:49pm
That is a possible but maximally uncharitable interpretation of the correspondent’s position. Mine is that in doing policy cost benefit analysis it is permissible to give a lower but not zero wight to benefits to foreigners than to residents (just as it is permissible to give lower but not zero weight to net benefits accruing to high income people). Admittedly this is pretty hypothetical. In most issues involving foreigners (immigration, trade) there is at the current margin no trade off between benefits to foreigners and residents. More trade and more immigration benefit both.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 7 2019 at 5:11pm
I suggest that Anthony de Jasay is right:
Jon Murphy
Sep 7 2019 at 7:16pm
My interpretation is not charitable but I’m going for accuracy and not charity. If he is who I think he is, he routinely argues that the nation is above all, especially the foreigner.
My interpretation is supported by the later part of the quote, specifically the “sacrificed” usage. That is zero-sum thinking, not virtuous thinking.
Jon Murphy
Sep 8 2019 at 12:34am
One final quick point: the message that most philosophers use the social circle theory discussed above (that we care more about family than neighbors, etc) is a distinctly individualistic, not nationalistic, argument. Social circle theory is used to explain why we don’t owe others outside our small circle benevolence or beneficence. It is decidedly not that foreigners count less in some cost-benefit analysis or that we should but the welfare of citizens above foreigners. It is a discussion of virtuous behavior: we owe benevolence and beneficence to our friends and family, to a lesser degree our neighbors, and to an even lesser degree to other citizens. We owe those outside our immediate social circle not much more than to obey the rules of justice. Adam Smith writes at length on this in TMS, as does the other philosophers I mention below (also include David Hume and Lord Kames). To use that reasoning to argue that foreigners count less, or that domestic citizens should take preference, or that certain policies like protectionism are justified on these grounds, is to turn the argument on its head.
Mark Z
Sep 7 2019 at 4:56pm
While I think it’s natural to care about those close than those far away, I don’t think this necessarily applies to nation-states; that is, I don’t think it’s natural or inevitable for New Yorkers to care more about Oregonians than about Torontians.
And just because an instinct is natural and impossible to repress entirely doesn’t mean it it isn’t harmful or shouldn’t be minimized to the best of our ability.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 7 2019 at 5:12pm
Two important points.
Dylan
Sep 8 2019 at 8:52am
I must be weird, because I don’t seem to care more about strangers that are close to me than those that are far away. In fact, my sympathies tend to be with those that were born in developing countries a lot more than those born in the U.S., both because of the level of absolute poverty and because it seems a lot easier to do “everything right” and still end up in a bad situation when you are born into those kinds of circumstances (which are luckily fairly rare here).
Jon Murphy
Sep 8 2019 at 9:20am
The key word in your reply is “strangers.” A stranger is a stranger regardless of geographic distance.
But I’m willing to bet you still fit into the general mold. Ask yourself this: when was the last time you made a personal sacrifice for someone on the other side of the world? Eg: drove them somewhere, bought them something, took them out to dinner, paid off medical bills, something like that. Something for which you expected no recompense. I’m sure you’ve done some stuff (given to charity most likely. Maybe served in Peace Corps or missionary work), but I bet you do a lot more of that stuff for family and friends. And you likewise expect more from family and friends, too.
Your relationship with strangers is mostly built on justice, that is not being a jerk to one another. Your relationship with friends and family is more built on benelovence, love, generosity, etc.
When a friend or family member experiences tragedy or loss, you likely feel for them moreso than you would a greater tragedy across the world. I severely doubt that the loss of a child to some person in Rowanda causes you the same anguish or heartbreak as the loss of a child to a friend. Indeed, I’d argue that of it did, you’d be unable to function given the sheer loss that occurs daily.
Dylan
Sep 9 2019 at 10:45am
The word stranger was chosen on purpose. I’d originally written a thing about caring more about friends and family, and even friends of friends more, but then figured there was a perfectly good and shorter way of expressing the same concept.
You’re of course right that I care more, and do more for the people I directly know, and even those that are one degree away from me, because helping them also helps my friends. But, you get much beyond that level, and I’m pretty indifferent to helping one group of people over another, just because one group is geographically closer to me. Which I think is the point that Mark was making, that most people will choose the group that is closer to them for one reason or another.
Jon Murphy
Sep 9 2019 at 12:40pm
That makes sense Dylan. I don’t think it makes you weird at all; just that you have smaller social circles.
Mark Z
Sep 9 2019 at 12:29am
Well, for most people at least, who one cares for more or less isn’t a consequence of rational reasoning, even for most people who are aware of the ‘irrationality’ of their discrimination, if that’s the right word. I’m thinking of Peter Singer’s drowning child analogy. Even if one believes one should care as much about someone one could save far away as someone close, one will still probably react emotionally more to the drowning child nearby.
Dylan
Sep 9 2019 at 10:37am
That’s a good point, and I should amend my previous statement. Revealed preferences does suggest I care more about those people that are right in front of me, even if they are strangers. I hope that I would jump in and save a drowning kid in front of me, where I obviously could do more to save the life of a kid on the other side of the world, yet I don’t. But, if there were strangers on the other side of town that were as hard up as a kid born into poverty in India, I don’t see that I’d be more likely to donate to a charity to help the kids in my town than I would be to donate to one to help the Indian kids.
Jon Murphy
Sep 7 2019 at 8:31am
Good stuff as always, Pierre. If the correspondent is interested in a “libertarian” argument for the social contract, I recommend James Buchanan’s Limits of Liberty (especially chapters 4-6, see also Appendix I in Calculus of Consent and Gordon Tullock’s Appendix A in the Liberty Fund’s collection of his works Law and Economics) and Jan Narveson’s essay on Contractarianism in “Arguments for Liberty,” edited by Aaron Ross Powell and Grant Babcock (both available for free at their respective links).
Jon Murphy
Sep 7 2019 at 11:05am
The state qua parent argument has a long history in natural law thinking. Many of the early thinkers, such as Carmichel, Hutcheson, Grotius, and Puffendorf, built up the idea of a state from the idea of family unions. Of course, with few exceptions, they never went as far as to demand absolute obedience or claim that the state makes the person. Indeed, one could rightfully rebel against the state if it failed to uphold its goals of protection from external threats and defense of internal liberty. Furthermore, Edmund Burke excellently satirizes the state qua parent/family reasoning in his pamphlet Vindication of Natural Society.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 7 2019 at 12:25pm
Useful addendum!
Jon Murphy
Sep 7 2019 at 12:47pm
Thank you!
Thaomas
Sep 7 2019 at 2:52pm
Jon. Having seen your posts from before and after coming to GMU, I’d say that the value added is great! You made a good choice!
Jon Murphy
Sep 7 2019 at 7:08pm
Thank you very much!
Sam Grove
Sep 9 2019 at 10:39am
It is notable the intellectual vacuity behind the impulse to engage in second hand oppression of other individuals. Actions that few would personally be willing to engage in become so much easier to support when hiding behind collective action.
That’s why war making persists, the remoteness of second hand nature of collective agency makes it all to easy to evade any personal connection to the slaughter effected by state “authority”.
Miguel Madeira
Sep 9 2019 at 12:18pm
“The exchange suggested that, as much as he defines himself as a conservative, my correspondent is an unconscious Rousseauist”
I have the theory that a conservative is a Rousseauist in a spiritist séance, or Edmund Burke = Rousseau + Allan Kardec (both think that “freedom” is the “fredoom” to obey to something like the general will, and the difference is that the conservative alsoc count with the opinion of the deads to define what is the general will).
Jon Murphy
Sep 9 2019 at 12:39pm
I don’t know who Allan Kardec is, but I would disagree Burke is Rousseauian. He was a conservative, yes, and was wary of revolution, but he certainly did not think obedience to a sovereign resulted of some original contract or was absolute. He opposed anarchy, yes, but that’s not particularly Rousseauian.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 9 2019 at 12:49pm
Interestingly, Hayek puts Burke among the classical liberals.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 9 2019 at 12:50pm
Or, at least, among the “true individualists.”
Jon Murphy
Sep 9 2019 at 1:17pm
I think he is a classical liberal. When I use the term “conservative” in this manner, I just mean a presumption of the status quo, that institutions shouldn’t be changed willy-nilly.
Pierre Lemieux
Sep 9 2019 at 12:47pm
You raise an interesting question, which illustrates how complex theories are not often touchy to pigeonhole. (This is even truer when the author is dead and can only reply Yes or No to a competent spiritist!) There is a way to interpret Rousseau not only as a conservative, but nearly as a liberal-conservative: Jean-Marie Benoist did it in his 1985 Les outils de la liberté, where he takes the “general will” to mean the rule of law. I have always found this difficult to accept (even if Jean-Marie Benoist was an enjoyable lunch companion). Rousseau seems to me to represent more a reaction against the Enlightenment. He espoused what was worst in the Enlightenment (see Hayek) and discarded what was best (including the modern idea of liberty).
Roger McKinney
Sep 10 2019 at 10:17am
From another perspective, it’s OK to care more about your own country than a foreign country and it’s OK to care more for a foreign country than your own. What’s wrong is forcing me to care about someone or something that I don’t want to care about. If I care about American workers more than Chinese then I’ll buy American, but you have no right to force me buy American stuff only or to force me to buy Chinese goods. Who you care for is a red herring. The issue is whether you’ll force me to care or not.
BTW, the great Bastiat hated Plato, Aristotle and Cicero because they taught a brutal, slave-based “freedom” and unlimited state power. He blamed the study of them for the rise of socialism in France and the love of war.
Nick Ronalds
Sep 29 2019 at 7:52am
Pierre, I just read your review “Not the Average Economist,” on the 40th anniversary of James Buchanan’s “What should Economists do?”. I thought it was an excellent summary of Buchanan’s thought and very well written, or at least I felt I had a better understanding of his major positions. In general I find your writing to be consistently first rate. Well done.
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