The Economics of Welfare

Pigou, Arthur C.
(1877-1959)
CEE
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Editor/Trans.
First Pub. Date
1920
Publisher/Edition
London: Macmillan and Co.
Pub. Date
1932
Comments
4th edition.
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Part III, Chapter II
THE CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL DIFFERENCES

III.II.1

§ 1. A NECESSARY preliminary to analysis is some classification of differences. The classification which naturally suggests itself in the first instances is one based upon the character of the matters in dispute. Such a classification yields two divisions, each in turn containing further subdivisions. The divisions comprise respectively differences about "the fraction of wages" and differences about "the demarcation of function." Differences about the fraction of wages may be subdivided into:

(1) Those connected with the reward of labour, generally raising an issue as to the money rate of wage, but sometimes touching such matters as workshop fines or the amount of special allowances, whether in money or in kind;
(2) Those connected with the doing and bearing of the employees, generally involving the question of hours.

III.II.2

Differences as to demarcation of function include, besides the well-known, but relatively unimportant, "demarcation disputes" between kindred trades, all quarrels arising out of claims by the workpeople to a larger share in the work of management. They generally relate to:

(1) The way in which work is apportioned between different classes of workmen and machine tools; or
(2) The sources from which the employer draws his workpeople; or
(3) The voice allowed to workpeople in the settlement of working conditions.

III.II.3

The second of these subdivisions includes all questions concerning discrimination against, preference to, or exclusive employment of, trade unionists.

III.II.4

§ 2. For many purposes the above classification is the most convenient to follow. But for the task of constructing machinery for preserving industrial peace it is not of serious value, because in practice the design of the machinery never turns upon distinctions between wages differences, differences about hours, or differences about the demarcation of work. We have, therefore, to seek some classification better adapted to the purpose in hand. In this search we are driven to follow two lines of thought, neither of which affords exact or sharp distinctions, but both of which, as will presently appear, somehow run together and yield a compound classification. They turn, respectively, upon the degree of self-sufficiency enjoyed by the parties to the difference and upon the extent of the theoretical ground which they have in common.

III.II.5

§ 3. Under the former of these two heads the determining factor is the relation between the bodies which control negotiations and those which are directly affected by their result. Both the employers and the workpeople implicated may be entirely independent, or both may be subordinate branches of larger organisations; or the employers may be independent and the workpeople a branch; or the employers a branch and the workpeople independent. This distinction is, however, somewhat blurred in practice, because to be a branch of a wider organisation is not the same thing as to have no control over negotiations affecting one's own interests. The extent to which local organisations are subordinated in this matter to national unions varies greatly in different times and places. They may be left entirely free; they may be free to make, but not to denounce, agreements; they may be offered advice or deprived of strike pay; or they may be mere branches, compelled to carry out the instructions of the central executive. Consequently, in this form of classification, no sharp dividing lines can be drawn.

III.II.6

§ 4. The same remark applies to the latter of the two forms distinguished above. In every industrial difference there is some common ground between the parties. Even when they diverge most widely, both sides agree that the decision ought to be "just." Sometimes the full limit of agreement is expressed by this phrase. A case in point is the coal strike of 1893, in which the employers understood by justice payment according to efficiency, and the work-people, in a vague way, payment according to needs. The common basis is wider when it is agreed, whether formally or informally, that justice, rightly interpreted, is the doctrine that the wage level should move in the same general direction as some accepted external index. This stage is often reached when the wages of a small group of workmen are in question; for it is generally recognised that these ought not, as a rule, to move very differently from the average wage level of other men in the neighbourhood engaged in similar employment. It is also reached with regard to the wages of larger groups, when the doctrine is accepted that, other things being equal, wages ought, in some sense, to follow prices. Thus, throughout the series of arbitrations in the North of England iron trade studied by Mr. Price, "there is a general agreement that the basis of award is to be primarily the relation of wages to selling price."*3 The common ground here, however, is merely that wages shall rise when prices rise and fall when prices fall. The question of what proportion should hold between the two movements, or what change on the one side "corresponds" to a given change on the other, is left unanswered. A further stage is reached when the exact proportion that the wage change ought to bear to a given change in the index is agreed upon. This is done where employers and employed, in any locality or firm, accept, as in the spinning industry, the average efficiency wage of the trade or district as their own standard, or when wage is related to price by a definite sliding scale. Here the common ground, so far as principle is concerned, is complete, and differences between the parties can only arise upon matters of fact.

III.II.7

§ 5. The discussion of the two preceding sections shows that no sharp divisions are to be found along either of the lines of classification which have been discussed. This, however, is not the last word upon the matter. It may still be necessary, here as elsewhere, for the student with a practical end in view to depart somewhat from the majestic continuity of Nature, and to erect an arbitrary landmark of his own. Such a landmark may be made out of the common division of industrial differences into "those which concern the interpretation of the existing terms of employment," and "those which have to do with the general terms of future employment."*4 This distinction is analogous to one familiar to the theory of jurisprudence. "The settlement of such general questions may be likened to an act of legislation; the interpretation and application of the general contract may be likened to a judicial act."*5 The place assigned to any particular difference is made to turn primarily upon the question whether or not it is governed by a formal agreement between the parties. All differences which arise when there is an agreement are called "interpretation differences," and are distinguished from "those which arise out of proposals for the terms of engagement or contract of service to subsist for a future period."*6 Furthermore, these differences are often identical with those which superior organisations undertake to settle on behalf of their local branches; they "are for the most part limited to particular establishments, of little importance and often purely personal";*7 dealing, it may be, with controversies of fact concerning quantity, or quality, or the more precise definition of the mutually accepted pattern of quality itself. "General questions," on the other hand, are, for the most part, equivalent to those in which independent organisations are directly concerned; they are "frequently of wide interest, affect large bodies of men, and are the most general cause of strikes and lock-outs on a large scale."*8 Of course it is not maintained that interpretation differences in the above sense are necessarily of minor importance. Not only, as with judge-made law, may the act of interpretation slide insensibly into that of alteration, but also what is called interpretation may cover as wide a field, and raise questions quite as fundamental, as those treated in the general agreement. For example, there is no difference in this respect between the question how many pounds a ton of coal is to be taken to contain, or how much "topping" the men must put upon a car-load, and the question what the wage per ton or car-load ought to be. Moreover, it sometimes happens that general questions are deliberately submitted for discussion on what are apparently interpretation references. For example, in the pottery boom of 1871, it was arranged that, for each branch of the trade, an individual case should be selected for arbitration, and that the whole branch should act in accordance with the award.*9 On subsequent occasions exactly the same result was achieved by general arbitrations of the ordinary type. Similarly, it is not maintained that differences as to the terms of a future contract, to be made otherwise than by the interpretation of some overshadowing agreement, must necessarily affect large bodies of men. Where the local branches of ill-organised trades have to negotiate new contracts for themselves without reference to such an agreement, the number of men affected by any difference which may arise must be small. Nevertheless, the sentences quoted above from the American Industrial Commission and the British Royal Commission on Labour represent the facts sufficiently well to provide the basis of a rough practical classification.


Notes for this chapter


3.
L. L. Price, Industrial Peace, p. 62.
4.
U.S.A. Industrial Commission, xvii. p. lxxv.
5.
Ibid. p. lxxvi.
6.
Royal Commission on Labour, Report, p. 49.
7.
Ibid. p. 49.
8.
Ibid. p. 49.
9.
Cf. Owen, Potteries, p. 142.

Part III, Chapter III

End of Notes


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