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27 Books found for search term(s): James Buchanan

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1. (100)
 

Foreword (score: 100)

Selected Bibliography (score: 100)

Ch. 3, Constraints on Base and Rate Structure (score: 43)

Ch. 2, Natural Government (score: 40)

Ch. 10, Toward Authentic Tax Reform (score: 34)

Ch. 4, The Taxation of Commodities (score: 33)

Ch. 1, Taxation in Constitutional Perspective (score: 28)

Ch. 7, The Disposition of Public Revenues (score: 26)

Ch. 5, Taxation through Time (score: 24)

Ch. 8, The Domain of Politics (score: 17)

Ch. 9, Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority (score: 17)

Ch. 6, Money Creation and Taxation (score: 16)

Epilogue (score: 16)

2. (81)
 
Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes
Buchanan, James M. and Richard E. Wagner

Ch. 9, Institutional Constraints and Political Choice (score: 81)

Foreword (score: 55)

Ch. 7, Keynesian Economics in Democratic Politics (score: 51)

Ch. 6, The Presuppositions of Harvey Road (score: 43)

Ch. 3, First, the Academic Scribblers (score: 37)

Ch. 2, The Old-Time Fiscal Religion (score: 34)

Ch. 12, A Return to Fiscal Principle (score: 28)

Ch. 1, What Hath Keynes Wrought (score: 11)

Ch. 4, The Spread of the New Gospel (score: 9)

Ch. 10, Alternative Budgetary Rules (score: 9)

Ch. 11, What about Full Employment (score: 9)

Ch. 5, Assessing the Damages (score: 8)

Ch. 8, Money-Financed Deficits and Political Democracy (score: 8)

3. (77)
 

Foreword (score: 77)

Ch. 13, Some Preliminary Research Results (score: 29)

Ch. 9, Individual Choice and the Indivisibility of Public Goods (score: 28)

Ch. 7, The Bridge Between Tax and Expenditure in the Fiscal Decision Process (score: 20)

Ch. 8, Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Choice (score: 18)

Ch. 14, The Levels of Fiscal Choice (score: 18)

Ch. 17, The Institution of Public Debt (score: 18)

Ch. 18, Fiscal Policy Constitutionally Considered (score: 18)

Ch. 10, The Fiscal Illusion (score: 17)

Ch. 19, Fiscal Nihilism and Beyond (score: 17)

Ch. 1, Introduction (score: 10)

Ch. 2, Individual Demand for Public Goods (score: 10)

Ch. 4, Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice (score: 9)

Ch. 5, Existing Institutions and Change (score: 9)

Ch. 6, Earmarking Versus General-Fund Financing (score: 9)

Ch. 12, From Theory to the Real World (score: 9)

Ch. 15, Income-Tax Progression (score: 9)

Ch. 16, Specific Excise Taxation (score: 9)

Ch. 3, Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice (score: 8)

Ch. 11, Simple Collective Decision Models (score: 8)

4. (76)
 

Supplementary Reading Materials (score: 76)

Foreword (score: 66)

Ch. 9, Which Goods Should Be Public (score: 34)

Ch. 4, Pure and Impure Public Goods (score: 24)

Ch. 2, Simple Exchange in a World of Equals (score: 17)

Ch. 3, Simple Exchange in a World of Unequals (score: 17)

Ch. 1, A Methodological Introduction (score: 10)

Ch. 7, The Publicness of Political Decisions (score: 9)

Ch. 8, The Institutions of Fiscal Choice (score: 9)

Ch. 10, Toward a Positive Theory of Public Finance (score: 9)

Ch. 5, Many Private Goods, Many Persons (score: 8)

5. (74)
 

Selected Bibliography (score: 74)

Foreword (score: 44)

Ch. 3, Postconstitutional Contract (score: 24)

Ch. 9, The Threat of Leviathan (score: 24)

Ch. 1, Commencement (score: 17)

Ch. 8, The Punishment Dilemma (score: 17)

Ch. 7, Law as Public Capital (score: 16)

Ch. 5, Continuing Contract and the Status Quo (score: 9)

Ch. 6, The Paradox of Being Governed (score: 9)

Ch. 10, Beyond Pragmatism (score: 9)

Ch. 2, The Bases for Freedom in Society (score: 8)

Ch. 4, Constitutional Contract (score: 8)

6. (70)
 
The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan

Foreword (score: 70)

Ch. 2, The Contractarian Vision (score: 65)

Ch. 9, Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy (score: 51)

Ch. 4, Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Analysis (score: 40)

Ch. 8, Politics Without Rules, II (score: 40)

Ch. 3, The Myth of Benevolence (score: 34)

Ch. 5, Time, Temptation, and the Constrained Future (score: 34)

Ch. 6, Politics Without Rules, I (score: 34)

Ch. 1, The Constitutional Imperative (score: 26)

Ch. 7, Rules and Justice (score: 9)

7. (53)
 
1958

Foreword (score: 53)

Ch. 1, Introduction (score: 23)

Ch. 7, The Rule of Unanimity (score: 21)

Appendix 2, Theoretical Forerunners (score: 21)

Ch. 4, Individual Rationality in Social Choice (score: 17)

Appendix 1, Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy (score: 12)

Ch. 2, The Individualistic Postulate (score: 9)

Ch. 13, Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution (score: 9)

Ch. 20, The Politics of the Good Society (score: 9)

Ch. 6, A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions (score: 8)

Ch. 10, Simple Majority Voting (score: 8)

Ch. 14, The Range and Extent of Collective Action (score: 8)

Ch. 16, The Bicameral Legislature (score: 8)

Ch. 17, The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule (score: 8)

Ch. 9, The Structure of the Models (score: 7)

Ch. 19, Pressure Groups, Special Interests, and the Constitution (score: 7)

Ch. 3, Politics and the Economic Nexus (score: 6)

Ch. 5, The Organization of Human Activity (score: 6)

Ch. 8, The Costs of Decision-Making (score: 6)

Ch. 11, Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games (score: 6)

Ch. 12, Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality (score: 6)

Ch. 15, Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables (score: 6)

Ch. 18, Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency (score: 6)

8. (49)
 
L.S.E. Essays on Cost
Edited by: Buchanan, James M. and George F. ThirlbyCEE
1934

Preface (score: 49)

Acknowledgements (score: 20)

Buchanan, Introduction, L.S.E. cost theory in retrospect (score: 18)

Edwards, Rationale of Cost Accounting (score: 9)

Wiseman, Uncertainty, costs, and collectivist economic planning (score: 9)

Thirlby, Economists cost rules and equilibrium theory (score: 9)

Robbins, Remarks on certain aspects (score: 8)

Hayek, Economics and Knowledge (score: 8)

Coase, Business organization and the accountant (score: 8)

Thirlby, Subjective theory of value and accounting cost (score: 8)

Thirlby, The Ruler (score: 8)

Thirlby, The economists description of business behaviour (score: 8)

Wiseman, The theory of public utility price (score: 8)

9. (46)
 
1982

Comments by James M. Buchanan (score: 46)

Comments by Roland Vaubel (score: 33)

Comments by Mario J. Rizzo (score: 27)

Comments by Israel M. Kirzner (score: 27)

Comments by Karen I. Vaughn (score: 25)

Comments by Jeremy Shearmur (score: 25)

Comments by David Gordon (score: 25)

10. (40)
 
1982

Constitution or Competition, Alternative Views on Monetary Reform, Bibliography (score: 40)

11. (33)
 
1969

Foreword (score: 33)

Ch. 3, Cost and Choice (score: 18)

Ch. 5, Private and Social Cost (score: 18)

Ch. 4, The Cost of Public Goods (score: 17)

Ch. 1, Cost in Economic Theory (score: 9)

Ch. 6, Cost Without Markets (score: 9)

Ch. 2, The Origins and Development of a London Tradition (score: 8)

12. (29)
 
1982

F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism, continued (score: 29)

F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism, Bibliography (score: 26)

F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism (score: 6)

13. (28)
 
1976

Part 2, Essay 2 (score: 28)

Selected Bibliography (score: 14)

Part 2, Essay 5 (score: 8)

14. (28)
 
1977

Chapter 7 (score: 28)

Bibliography (score: 23)

Chapter 1 (score: 21)

15. (25)
 
1979

Property Rights and Natural Resource Management, Bibliography (score: 25)

16. (23)
 
1881

V.1, Entry 20, ADMINISTRATIONS (score: 23)

V.1, Entry 161, BUCHANAN (score: 17)

V.3, Entry 278, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (score: 6)

17. (21)
 
1867

Works and Authors (score: 21)

Part VIII, Chapter 27 (score: 20)

Part VI, Chapter 22 (score: 14)

Part I, Chapter 3 (score: 8)

18. (20)
 
The State
Jasay, Anthony deBIO
1985

Preface (score: 20)

Authors Note (score: 17)

Introduction (score: 9)

19. (13)
 

Ch. 2, The New Orthodoxy (score: 13)

Ch. 12, When Should Government Borrow (score: 13)

Ch. 1, The Economists and Vulgar Opinion (score: 12)

Foreword (score: 10)

Ch. 5, The Analogy: True or False (score: 10)

Ch. 11, Public Debt and Inflation (score: 10)

Ch. 3, The Methodology of Debt Theory (score: 8)

Ch. 6, Internal and External Public Loans (score: 8)

Ch. 9, Public Debt and Depression (score: 8)

Ch. 10, War Borrowing (score: 8)

Ch. 13, Should Public Debt Be Retired (score: 8)

Ch. 14, Debt Retirement and Economic Stabilization (score: 8)

Ch. 4, Concerning Future Generations (score: 7)

Ch. 7, Consumption Spending, the Rate of Interest, Relative and Absolute Prices (score: 7)

Ch. 8, A Review of Pre-Keynesian Debt Theory (score: 6)

Appendix, A Suggested Conceptual Revaluation of the National Debt (score: 6)

20. (12)
 
1936

Preface, by Leland B. Yeager (score: 12)


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