Let’s start with the negatives:
1. This was one of the most complete capitulations by US negotiators since the 1973 peace agreement with North Vietnam. For years we’ve been demanding that North Korea de-nuclearize, and this agreement does not achieve that goal. Despite this failure, we gave up some significant concessions, including the meeting itself and also the end to certain training exercises. A hawkish skeptic might argue that this is all a delaying tactic from Kim. Think about the very bellicose language from President Trump after taking office. Perhaps Kim was worried that Trump would do something extreme, and this is a way of buying time. Meanwhile, Trump badly wanted a win, and that limited his ability to negotiate a tough agreement:
People briefed on the meetings said American negotiators had found it difficult to make significant headway with the North Koreans, in part because the White House did not back them up in taking a hard line.
2. Trump’s effusive praise for Kim as an individual was morally offensive and not even necessary. Imagine how Jewish people would feel if he offered similar praise for Hitler.
3. As is often the case, Trump’s comments were full of inaccuracies and hyperbole. Contrary to his claim, other Presidents have negotiated agreements to make the Korean peninsula nuclear free—indeed President Clinton did so in 1994.
So we have negotiated a deal that strongly favors the North Koreans, and followed through with inaccurate and offensive comments. How can there possibly by a bright side to the picture?
1. There weren’t any obvious good alternatives. It wasn’t clear that the US had any practical method of stopping the North from holding on to its nuclear weapons.
2. It’s at least possible that Kim wants to do a major policy change; somewhat analogous to what Deng did in China after Mao died, and yet still hold on to a significant number of nuclear weapons. This kind of move might be easier to do if international tensions are reduced, and this meeting might reduce tensions.
I’d encourage people to look at the picture in a different way:
1. The real issue is not the nukes; it’s the human rights situation in North Korea. In utilitarian terms, nukes are already going off in Korea. The suffering and death in North Korea caused by Kim’s regime is just as horrifying as the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most important goal should not be de-nuclearization, rather the focus should be on improved conditions in North Korea.
2. Focus on the relationship between North and South Korea, and view the US as a sideshow. If Kim is serious about change, the real action will revolve around his relationship with the South. In the optimistic scenario, this meeting is sort of a way to get the US out of the picture, so that he can move ahead constructively with President Moon. Neither Kim or Moon want bellicose language from the US overshadowing their efforts. In addition, this meeting makes it more likely that Trump will allow Moon to go further in engagement with the North than what might otherwise have been possible.
Thus it’s at least plausible that this agreement is a net plus. But before supporters of Trump get too enthused, the very same logic that suggests this might be a net plus also suggests that Trump’s Iran policy is a huge missed opportunity.
Trump’s policy is probably misguided in either Korea or Iran; I’m just not sure which one. I sometimes think that foreign policy is like the movie industry—“nobody knows anything”. And that includes me.
READER COMMENTS
E. Harding
Jun 12 2018 at 1:36pm
“Trump’s policy is probably misguided in either Korea or Iran; I’m just not sure which one.”
I pick Iran. But there is consistency in Trump’s approaches to both. In neither case are sanctions (Trump’s and the foreign policy elites’ favorite and least effectual tool) getting lifted.
Tine Scath
Jun 12 2018 at 2:21pm
The point about Moon is spot on. The deal is vague and Trump conceded things he shouldn’t have, but if it allows Moon and Kim to continue the rapprochement they begun back in April all the other negatives matter very little. Moon has for years before becoming president pushed for more open relations between North and South, attaining those, especially economic ties, will do more to improve the lot of Koreans north and south than any hardline insistence on denuclearization.
Michael Sandifer
Jun 12 2018 at 2:22pm
I don’t understand the fixation on denuclearization. For one, North Korea will not do it voluntarily, even with an official end to the war, which would include a US pullout. North Korea has strong incentives to hold on to nukes, as South Korea is still vastly more conventionally powerful than they are, and relations with China have been deteriorating for years. Unless North Korea starts to accelerate liberalization considerably, some important Chinese-North Korean interests will continue to diverge.
Trying to force North Korea to denuclearize is too dangerous, so containment seems the only option.
Trump wants to pull out of South Korea, so perhaps all parties involved will declare victory after an agreement is reached on long-range ballistic missiles. But is such a scenario involving a US pullout a victory for any countries, but China and North Korea?
I don’t see any possible gain for the US from this summit and the apparent path of policy progression. We should continue to contain North Korea and China militarily, and respond to real indications of economic liberalization with increased opportunities for trade and the lifting of some sanctions.
In short, North Korea will not denuclearize under this regime, their missile capability is irrelevant as MAD is as good a deterent as any, and so our sole focus should be on economic liberalization, which would be the only realistic, peaceful path to a better life for the North Korean people and more peaceful relations internationally.
The above differs somewhat from your focus Scott, at least nominally, as I think economic liberalization tends to lead to more political liberalization in the long run. I wouldn’t focus so much on human rights directly, as on economic liberalization.
John Thacker
Jun 12 2018 at 2:43pm
President Moon underscores one difference between Iran and North Korea – with North Korea, the most interested US ally, South Korea, highly favors a deal. Japan is no fan of missiles flying over its islands, but more skeptical, and allies outside the region seem even more so on average. While it’s possible to argue that President Moon may not have been elected without the ridiculous President Park scandal, I think that sells him short. ROK opinion and government really should have some influence, or else the US is just a colonial power.
With Iran, the most interested US allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia, did not favor the deal, even as allies elsewhere not in the region did. That’s a difference that a determined person could use for supporting Trump’s actions on both.
Quite Likely
Jun 12 2018 at 2:48pm
The problem with international politics is that people categorize certain countries as “enemies” and then think the appropriate policy is to do whatever causes the most damage to that country. It’s maddening since the sensible attitude for the US to take with pretty much all of its current “enemies” is to minimize conflict and maximize peaceful engagement. The only real potential good outcome of engagement with North Korea is peace, detente, and letting the DPRK gradually reform at its own pace.
Scott Sumner
Jun 12 2018 at 3:10pm
Michael, In North Korea there is a huge overlap between political and economic liberalization. Most of the damage done (including periodic famines) is due to bad economic policies. Economic rights are human rights.
John, Agree about that difference, but I don’t see how it’s a “good reason” for nixing the Iran deal.
Here’s what the two decisions have in common. Trump wants to act, to do something, and in each case acting involves reversing the policy of the previous administration.
Michael Sandifer
Jun 12 2018 at 3:35pm
Scott,
I agree, that in a country with so little economic freedom, there is significant overlap between economic liberalization and human rights. However, I don’t see how a direct focus on human rights will be considered palatable for the Kim regime. I don’t see them putting an increased emphasis on human rights in any meaningful way, as that would imply their unjustified, complete denial of human rights for decades.
Better it seems to use the language of economic liberalization, allowing them to shift toward economic openness, by claiming to simply be responding to a changing world. They don’t want to admit to having been evil for generations.
John Thacker
Jun 12 2018 at 3:40pm
Scott,
I don’t agree, but someone who is particularly focused on relationships with in-theater allies (or who believes that in-theater allies have special knowledge of local circumstance and/or are necessary to make a deal work) could find it a good reason. It should also provide at least some comfort for those worried that the USA in general or the Trump Administration in particular is some unrestrained hyperpower not caring about the opinions of other countries. (Obviously for those who feel that the Saudis or Israelis have too much influence it provides the opposite of comfort.)
Musca
Jun 12 2018 at 3:53pm
Scott said:
One may agree that the suffering and death in North Korea are as horrifying as the outcome of a nuclear explosion. However, as a realpolitik counter to utilitarianism, the current human rights abuses are limited to those within North Korean borders. Denuclearlization is intended to prevent “suffering and death” to those outside its borders, specifically the US and its allies.
In other words – though it may be tribal – for US political figures charged with protecting US lives and property, preventing US suffering is more important than preventing North Korean suffering.
Mark Z
Jun 12 2018 at 9:41pm
Scott: On #1. If your next door neighbor 1) is a violent psychopath with dangerous weapons who routinely expresses intense hatred for you, and 2) beats his children; which of these two things worries you more? Now, maybe if you’re really altruistic, the first thing; but it’s quite expected that a self-interested person would worry more about the second.
You might argue that it isn’t really us but rather South Korea and Japan that are threatened, and that it is irrational to care more about your friends than about strangers, but I think the US has self-interested reasons for being more worried about the welfare of the Japanese and South Koreans than about North Koreans. Foreign policy is about interests first and foremost. Specifically, one’s own interests. So, to the US, it makes sense that the nukes are what matters.
That doesn’t mean NK needs to disarm; they could also become a relatively normal country over time like China and we wouldn’t need to worry about them as much.
HL
Jun 12 2018 at 10:01pm
Another great post. I really think you get to the heart of the matter, esp. regarding the importance of South Korea in this situation.
One note: Clinton cancelled the Team Spirit exercise before the US and North Korea came up with the Agreed Framework on IAEA safeguards in the country.
I think people really underestimate how strong South Korea is as far as the North Korean risk is concerned. The undetected B1 flight last year revealed that North Korean conventional capability is basically a paper tiger (this fear also explains why they staged that odd press conference outside the UN headquarters in fall last year). In contrast, South Korea has one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world (600k active, a couple of million reservists) and its deep national pride in democratic traditions means that there is no incentive whatsoever for the North to even imagine a reunification scenario. People talk about nuclear asymmetry, but it is a well-known secret that nuclear weapons are effectively useless as offensive weapons (i.e. “compellance” is basically impossible unless you are and remain as the only country in the world with the weapons, i.e. US in the late 1940s and early 1950s). It is the ridiculously extreme risk-aversion among the old conservative elite that underpin the country’s apparent desire for continued large US military presence near Seoul. Basically, they want to act tough on North Korea, but they don’t want to pay and work for that. This explains why they have been sabotaging the efforts to take back the wartime command of South Korean military forces from the US (which is kinda crazy)…
So my guess is that South Korea has enough capability to restrain and reorient North Korea’s behaviour on its own. In that sense, Moon’s “peace institutionalization” plan probably has a real chance for success, and you are right to say that perhaps a more passive stance by the US might help because it reduces pointless risk-aversion and mistrust between actors.
It is just unfortunate to pursue this with Trump (and John Bolton) in the White House, but oh well…Hillary actually wanted to do the same at the start of Obama’s administration, but the far right-wing government in Seoul kept pushing back because it wanted its own perpetual war for domestic political edge vs. South Korean liberals. So Obama simply gave up and began marketing his lack of initiatives as “strategic patience”. The kind of lackadaisical approach he showed vis-a-vis Fed appointees. So 8 years later we had to deal with Norks who had not only fine-tuned their warheads but also developed ICBMs….
The entire history is quite frustrating. Anyway, let’s hope Norks are serious about becoming a slightly more “normal” country.
Adam
Jun 12 2018 at 10:04pm
Yeah, dealing with sovereign, dictatorial states is tough. Not at all a chaulkboard problem.
Our current President understands the difference between talk versus closing the deal. He will close the deal–or else.
Scott Sumner
Jun 13 2018 at 4:38pm
Michael, Don’t worry about it either way. I assure you that they couldn’t care less what I (or even Trump) says about human rights, economic liberalization or any other issue.
Musca, I doubt whether people like Trump care about the welfare of either Americans or North Koreans,
Mark, I am concerned about North Korean nukes, but I’m also concerned about Russian nukes. An accidental nuclear exchange with Russia is probably more likely than a North Korean first strike. Again, I’m not saying we shouldn’t be concerned about North Korea, it is a threat. But things need to be put in perspective, and the human rights problem there is a much bigger concern.
Adam, So far he’s show little skill at dealmaking. Remember the repeal of Obamacare he promised? He failed to “close that deal” by one vote. John McCain. Do you think someone good at closing deals would mock and ridicule a former POW about his imprisonment, if he badly needed his vote? Does that strike you as the sort of person who is good at closing deals? How about the DACA deal that he promised, which never happened? How about giving up major concessions to North Korea, and getting nothing verifiable in return? How about his skill at doing trade deals with Canada, Mexico, Europe and China? Can you show me some evidence of his dealmaking? Anything?
I wonder if there has ever been a president as inept at dealmaking as Trump.
Scott Sumner
Jun 13 2018 at 4:39pm
HL, The South never prevented the North from behaving more responsibly. There were previous overtures from the South, and each time the North stabbed them in the back. It’s 100% the North’s fault.
HL
Jun 14 2018 at 9:25am
You are absolutely right about the North’s behaviour and the South’s inability to constrain or change it thus far.
My point isn’t about who is to be blamed (of course it is entirely the North’s), but rather whether or not a more effective incentive structure could be devised to induce a better behaviour out of them. Because they have the ICBMs now (re-entry tech not verified, however, thus not crossing Moon’s red line in 2017), we really have two choices. (1) Diplomacy. (2) Or a war to end all conflicts in the Korean peninsula. If the choice is (1), you might as well ensure that it has the maximum chance for success. At the end of the day, no one wants a pan-opticon nightmare state to have more nukes so that it can threaten its own people and its neighbors.
And my personal assessment (widely shared in S. Korea who have most at stake) is that Obama really didn’t do much, primarily due to the objection from Lee and Park administrations but also perhaps due to the realization that it is impossible to do anything (internationally supported pre-emptive strike or some sort of diplomatic endeavor) until North Korea actually develops nukes and missiles.
Todd Kreider
Jun 14 2018 at 7:10pm
“Despite this failure, we gave up some significant concessions, including the meeting itself and also the end to certain training exercises.”
They can start up again.
Ed Hanson
Jun 14 2018 at 8:35pm
I only skimmed the comments, but it look like they were generally positive to your views, Scott. Well, my comment is not. So here goes. Countering your negatives:
Why the word capitulation was even used is a complete mystery and I assume it was used simply for effect being in the first paragraph. Meeting with a leader of another country is never capitulation, short of being in a WWI vintage railroad car, or the deck of the Missouri. Then you use the word agreement as a capitulation. There is no agreement. Only a broad outline of the goals and the process to achieve them. As for ending war games on the peninsula, this is a win win. We save great expense, and N Korea loses its prime propaganda ploy. We do not do something three months down the line, N Korea must begin now making progress in negotiations. Since what you claim as capitulation is trivial, lets see what real capitulation would look like. End some sanctions immediately. DID NOT HAPPEN. Reduce the additional strategic and tactical weapons platforms brought to the area by President Trump. DID NOT HAPPEN. Remove the threat of military actions to end NK nuclear and missile program if the NK’s did not do so. DID NOT HAPPEN. Turn the whole issue over to China, and call it victory. DID NOT HAPPEN. These are real capitulations and of course, DID NOT HAPPEN.
Scott, you simply must not be old enough to remember the Korean War and its ending. President Trump is, as I am. No one can forget the stonewall negotiation tactics of NK. President Trump has made it perfectly clear he will have none of that. He does not want a win badly, he is determined to win. He will not let NK squirm out of a complete and verifiable agreement. If you need to have fears, then I advise you to place that fear at the correct possibility. President Trump will use the military option if it becomes the only viable option.
And what is with that vague block quote of “People briefed…” Absolutely worthless.
Effusive praise of Kim as in Hitler. I will simply give a counter example. What if effusive praise of Hitler had ended the holocaust, saving millions. Talk is cheap but in that case the value great.
Crap about Clinton does not wash. It was a narrow agreement connected to plutonium. When NK used the Uranium bomb loophole, bought from Pakistan, all of Clinton pathetic agreement went out the window. There was no there there.
Tell me again with the strategic might of the US aimed at N Korea things strongly favors them?
Positives?
1.) We have real alternatives and Kim knows it. see military option above. President Trump means it and Kim knows this.
2) Kim will never hold any nuclear weapons.
No not human rights, the real issue is the nukes and the missiles.
Ed
Gordon
Jun 14 2018 at 10:07pm
Scott, this is off topic but I wanted to let you know that the old url to your Econlog blog doesn’t work anymore with the site redesign. The following one will work.
http://www.econlib.org/econlog-by-author-and-letter/?selected_letter=S#ssumner
You’ll either need to update the link from your main blog or ask the website team here to fix things so that the old url works.
Mark Brady
Jun 15 2018 at 5:26am
Scott has scarcely begun his post when he equates his readers (“we”) with the United States, and immediately he loses this reader’s interest in what he is about to write.
1. This was one of the most complete capitulations by US negotiators since the 1973 peace agreement with North Vietnam. For years we’ve been demanding that North Korea de-nuclearize, and this agreement does not achieve that goal. Despite this failure, we gave up some significant concessions, including the meeting itself and also the end to certain training exercises.
I didn’t, and I don’t think Scott did either. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
Comments are closed.